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We shall evaluate two strategies for motivating the view that 
knowledge is the norm of belief.  The first draws on observations 
concerning belief’s aim and the parallels between belief and 
assertion.  The second appeals to observations concerning 
Moore’s Paradox.  Neither of these strategies gives us good 
reason to accept the knowledge account.  The considerations 
offered in support of this account motivate only the weaker 
account on which truth is the fundamental norm of belief. 
 
I.  Introduction 
In the wake of Williamson’s defence of the knowledge account of assertion, it is not surprising that 
an increasing number of authors are now defending the thesis that knowledge is the norm of 
belief.1  If knowledge is the norm of belief, you should not believe p unless you know p.  If you 
should not believe p unless you know p, it seems that a belief must constitute knowledge in order 
to be truly justified.2 
 Must we really refrain from believing what we do not know?  I think not.  I shall respond 
to arguments offered in support of the knowledge account, show that the view delivers the wrong 
verdicts, and show the considerations taken to support the view can be accommodated by 
alternative views such as the view that belief is governed by the truth norm.3  Because the 
knowledge account seems to have the implication that there are no false, justified beliefs, many 
                                                
1 Slote [1979], Williamson [2000], and Unger [1975] defend the thesis that knowledge is the 
norm of assertion.  Adler [2002], Bird [2007], Huemer [2007], Sutton [2007], Unger [1975], and 
Williamson [2000] say that knowledge is the norm of belief.  See Adler [2002], Kvanvig 
[forthcoming], and Sutton [2007] for arguments that seem to show that assertion and belief are 
governed by the same types of norms.    
2 At least, this seems to be an implication if we think of epistemic justification as a deontological 
notion and think that you can at most hope to be excused for violating epistemic norms.  Sutton 
[2007] thinks this is a consequence.  Bird [2007], Huemer [2007], and Williamson [2000] do not 
think knowledge that p is necessary for having a justified belief that p even though they think that 
knowledge is the norm of belief.  Littlejohn [forthcoming b] argues that a belief’s justification 
depends, inter alia, on whether that belief conforms to the norms governing belief.  In this paper, I 
shall speak as if conforming to the norm or norms of belief is necessary for a belief to be justified.  
If the reader does not accept this thesis, the reader can take my remarks to pertain primarily to 
the norms of belief.  None of the arguments in this paper assumes that justified beliefs conform to 
the norms governing belief.  
3 They might also be accommodated by views on which the norms of belief all have to do with 
evidence.  Conee and Feldman [2004] appear to defend a view on which belief is governed by 
evidential norms but not the truth norm. 
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will dismiss the view out of hand.  Dismissing the view in this way does not help us see where the 
arguments for this view go wrong.4  Since the view seems to be an obvious consequence of views 
now being seriously defended, the view deserves serious consideration.5  Hopefully internalists will 
be interested to see why the view is unmotivated and can add my complaints to theirs.  The 
externalists can approach this discussion with an eye towards determining whether the knowledge 
account is preferable to alternative externalist accounts of justified belief.     
  The aims of this paper are modest.  It is not my intention to offer a positive account of 
the norms of belief or analysis of justified belief.6  My aim is to show that when it comes to 
describing the norms of belief the traditional truth-first approach is preferable to the knowledge-
first approach.  We shall first look at some of the arguments inspired by Williamson’s remarks 
concerning assertion and the aim of belief.  Next, we shall examine the arguments of those who 
claim that reflection on Moore’s Paradox leads to the conclusion that knowledge is the norm of 
belief (e.g., Adler [2002]; Huemer [2007]).  If I am right, none of the arguments considered in this 
paper support the claim that belief is governed by the knowledge norm but only the considerably 
weaker claim that the fundamental norm of belief is the truth norm.     
 
II.  Truth and the Aim of Belief  
The first argument works from the assumption that all beliefs have a common aim and that our 
description of the aim of belief has a kind of normative significance.  To say that beliefs aim at X 
seems to carry with it the commitment to the further claim that any belief that doesn’t fulfil this 
aim isn’t as it ought to be.7  Suppose that belief really does aim at truth (Velleman [2000]; 
                                                
4 See Brewer [1999], Littlejohn [forthcoming a], and Sutton [2007] for three different externalist 
responses to the objection that intuition shows that the falsity of a belief is no obstacle to its 
justification.  In this paper, I am concerned with the showing that the truth account is preferable 
to the knowledge account.  Questions about the epistemic status of false beliefs are bracketed.  If 
someone can defend K without saying that knowledge is necessary for justified belief, someone 
can defend T without saying that truth is necessary for justified belief.  If the defenders of K can 
get away with denying the possibility of false, justified belief, so can the defenders of T.    
5  In addition to arguments from the norms of assertion to the norms of belief, Hawthorne [2004] 
and Hawthorne and Stanley [forthcoming] have argued that it is epistemically improper to rely 
on the premise p in reasoning whenever you do not know that p is true.  In Littlejohn [MS a], I 
defend the idea that the norms of belief determine whether the belief that p is ‘fit’ for providing 
premises for the purpose of practical deliberation.  
6 I defend a positive account in Littlejohn [forthcoming b; MS b]. 
7 For a defence of the view that claims about the aims of belief should be understood in normative 
terms, see Shah [2003].  Vahid [2006] seems to think that it is a mistake to try to draw normative 
conclusions from claims about what is constitutive about belief as a mental state.  Vahid might 
reject the argument for the knowledge account right from the outset, but as I think the argument 
 3 
Wedgwood [2002]; Williams [1973]).  Let us also suppose that it has no independent aim which a 
false belief might fulfil that would dispose us to say that the belief is correct, successful, or 
(objectively) as it should be.  Supposing this, it seems natural to say that even when something 
good comes of believing something false, such goods couldn’t justify believing something false.8  If 
the norms of belief can be derived from the proper description of the aims of belief, it seems that 
you should not ever believe p unless p.   
 Williamson [2000: 241] suggests you can derive the knowledge account of assertion from 
the assumption that you ought not assert what is not true.  If the derivation works for assertion, it 
seems a parallel derivation should work for belief. If there is such a derivation, it is far from 
straightforward.  Consider the utilitarian view that the only thing that could justify an action is the 
fact that the action is optimific.  Utilitarians do not think an action must be known to be optimific 
to be justified and no one has ever faulted them for this omission.  It is not hard to see that you 
are courting disaster if you advance a view on which there are positive duties that depend upon 
more than just effort or good will and insist that all duties must be knowingly discharged.  You 
will end up having to say that there are unknowable obligations that can be obligations insofar as 
they are knowable.         
 The difficulty is not so acute if we assume that the duties in question are primarily 
negative duties.  If belief is governed by a truth norm, the norm tells us to refrain from believing 
what is not true: 
T:  You should not believe that p is true unless it is true. 
The norm does not instruct us to believe everything that is true or anything that crosses our minds 
that happens to be true.  
To say that the fundamental norm of belief is the truth norm is not to say that this is the 
sole norm that governs belief.  Williamson seems to think that you cannot consistently say that 
there is a norm such as T without also saying that belief is governed by an evidential norm:  
E:  You should not believe that p is true unless you have 
adequate evidence for believing that p is true. 
In general, it seems that if it is wrong to Φ if condition C obtains, it is irresponsible to Φ unless 
you can reasonably assume that C does not obtain.  Whether it is reasonable to assume this 
depends upon whether you have adequate evidence for believing C not to obtain.  So, if we 
                                                
fails at a later step I hope to bracket this issue for the purposes of this discussion.  Thanks to an 
anonymous referee for pressing me on this point. 
8 Instead, it seems an excuse is called for.  While we might say there is some justification for 
something that is not permissible, it seems that something cannot be justified unless it is 
permissible. 
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assume that it is prima facie wrong to Φ irresponsibly, we can say that if T is true and it is wrong to 
believe p when p is not true, it is impermissible to believe p without adequate evidence of p’s truth 
because it would be irresponsible to so believe.9 
 On the assumption that belief is governed by the truth norm, we have to reject:  
FAULT-1: All epistemic wrongs are fault-implying wrongs (i.e., 
any condition that makes believing p wrongful is a condition that 
the believer can be faulted for failing to take account of if she 
believes p when that condition obtains).   
There is nothing wrong with rejecting this while accepting:  
FAULT-2: Any condition that grounds the charge of epistemic 
fault is a condition that makes belief wrongful.10 
It seems that Williamson’s reason for thinking E is a consequence of T might be something along 
the lines of FAULT-2.  He says:  
[I]f one must not bury people when they are not dead, then one 
should not bury them when one lacks evidence that they are 
dead.  It is at best negligent to bury someone without evidence 
that he is dead, even if he is in fact dead [2000: 245]. 
Let’s suppose he is right.  We do not have a full defence of the knowledge account: 
K:  You ought not believe p unless you know p.  
We first have to determine what it takes to satisfy the evidential norm.  Williamson [2000: 246] 
says that we do not satisfy the evidential norm unless we have evidence that puts us in a position 
to know that the belief in question is true.  If we think about lottery propositions, it seems we do 
not have adequate evidence to believe or assert such propositions.11  It seems the best explanation 
                                                
9 This might be an overly complicated way of stating the obvious point that you should not be 
epistemically irresponsible and that assuming responsibility obligates refraining from believing 
without adequate evidence.  The argument here is just restating Williamson’s argument [2000: 
245].  The success of this argument rests on the assumption that if one must refrain from Φ-ing 
unless C obtains, one should Φ only if one has evidence that C does obtain.  If this assumption is 
unmotivated, then Williamson’s argument that the knowledge account can be derived from the 
assumption that belief aims at the truth and is governed by the truth norm fails at an earlier step 
than I am claiming.  Note that if knowledge is the norm of belief, this argument would show that 
it would be irresponsible to believe p unless you had adequate evidence for believing that your 
belief that p is true would constitute knowledge.  If you think such evidence is unnecessary for 
permissible first-order belief, this is some reason to think that knowledge is not the norm of belief.     
10 For an illuminating discussion of the relationship between wrongs and fault, see Gardner 
[2005]. 
11 This is how Williamson explains the observation that you should not assert lottery propositions.  
It is not universally accepted that such assertions are epistemically improper.  Weiner [2005] 
 5 
as to why this is rests on the observation that the evidence we have for believing lottery 
propositions without insider’s information does not put us in a position to know that these claims 
are true.   
There are two ways of reading Williamson’s argument.  On the first reading, his remarks 
concerning lottery propositions gives us a clue as to what he thinks it takes to satisfy FAULT-2.  If 
you allow yourself to believe without first gathering evidence that puts you in a position to know 
that p, you seem to be at fault even if your belief turns out to be true.  After all, you could have 
weakened your commitment by simply believing that p is likely or probable.  On the second, we 
appeal directly to E and let intuition serve as our guide in determining what it takes to satisfy E 
rather than appeal to assumptions linking fault and justification.12   
On the first reading, the argument amounts to this:  
Belief aims at the truth.  For this reason, you should not believe something 
unless it is true.  If you do not know whether your belief is true, but you hold 
the belief anyway, this is irresponsible.  We generally assume that if you do 
not know whether you would violate a strict prohibition by Φ-ing but Φ 
anyway, you are at fault for Φ-ing.  It follows that you should not hold a 
belief about p if you do not know that p is true. 
The argument rests on a further assumption about fault:  
FAULT-3: You are irresponsible to Φ if you do not first know 
whether Φ-ing is permissible. 
Without the assumption, you cannot derive anything stronger than the claim that you ought not 
Φ unless you have conformed to the truth norm and are not unreasonable to assume that you 
have given the evidence you have. 
There are two reasons to reject FAULT-3.  Here is the first.  Suppose we say that 
knowledge is a condition necessary for permissible belief and also assume that FAULT-3 is correct.  
In saying this we would have to say either that mere knowledge of p’s truth is insufficient for 
permissibly believing p or we would have to endorse a KK thesis according to which you cannot 
know p unless you are in a position to know that you know that p is true.13 One of the more 
                                                
argues that such assertions violate Gricean maxims which means he can say that there is adequate 
evidence for believing and asserting lottery propositions even assuming that the evidence needed 
for epistemically permissible assertion and belief are the same.    
12 Jonathan Sutton suggested this second reading in conversation.  
13 If the point is not obvious, perhaps this helps.  According to K, it is not permissible to believe p 
unless you know p.  According to Fault-3, it is not permissible to believe p unless you know that 
you satisfy the conditions necessary for permissibly believing and one such condition is that p is 
known.  So, unless you thought that knowing that you know that p is a condition on having first-
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persuasive objections to the KK thesis is this.  It seems that knowledge of p’s truth requires that 
the means by which you arrived at the belief that p could not have easily led you to be mistaken 
about p.  According to the KK thesis, you do not satisfy the conditions for first-order knowledge 
unless you are in a position to know that you satisfy these conditions.  Second-order knowledge 
also requires that you would not easily be mistaken in the second-order belief (i.e., the belief that 
your first-order belief constitutes knowledge).  Our ordinary knowledge ascriptions suggest that 
knowledge does not require being in a position to know that you know.  We readily ascribe 
knowledge of p’s truth to someone knowing that she could have easily been mistaken in her 
second-order belief that she knew that p. We might know that the margin of error for second-
order knowledge is slim but the margin of error for first-order knowledge is sufficiently wide so 
they couldn’t have easily been mistaken about whether p but could have easily been mistaken 
about whether they knew p.  Concerning such cases, not only does it seem we readily ascribe you 
knowledge, we do not think that it is wrong for you to believe p.  This seems to disconfirm both 
the weak KK thesis and the thought that permissible belief involves more than just knowledge.14  
If we reject both, however, we have to reject FAULT-3.      
Here is the second reason to reject FAULT-3.  If combined with the knowledge account, it 
commits us to the JTB analysis of knowledge and an infallibilist conception of justification.  
Epistemic irresponsibility can make an otherwise justifiable belief unjustified.  According to 
FAULT-3, if you fail to know for any reason, you can be charged with epistemic irresponsibility.  
Thus, if you cannot be charged with epistemic irresponsibility because you are justified in 
believing p, the fact that you are justified in holding your belief is logically incompatible with (a) 
your belief being mistaken or (b) your belief being Gettiered.  One consequence of this is that you 
cannot satisfy the justification condition if it is possible that someone should have just your reasons 
but be mistaken about whether p.  Thus, your reasons must entail p if your belief that p is justified.  
But, no one seems to think that you must have entailing grounds to permissibly believe p.  Second, 
it seems that FAULT-3 has the consequence that if someone does not know that p, they are not 
justified in believing p, in which case Gettier cases are impossible.15   
                                                
order knowledge of p’s truth, you would have to say that knowledge of p’s truth is not sufficient for 
permissibly believing p.  I think we can reject the idea that knowledge of p’s truth is insufficient for 
permissibly believing p on the grounds that if it were insufficient, the claim ‘While p is true and he 
knows that it is, he should not believe it for epistemic reasons’ could express a true proposition.  It 
could not.   
14 For further discussion, see Williamson’s [2000: 145] remarks concerning iterations of 
knowledge and margins of error. 
15 To bring the knowledge account in line with epistemic intuition, we should distinguish between 
a believer that is justified in believing p and a belief that is justified.  For discussion of this 
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In light of these problems, I think an alternative reading of the argument might be more 
charitable.  On this reading, the argumentative burden is shouldered not entirely by assumptions 
about fault and epistemic responsibility, but also by cases such as those involving lottery 
propositions.16  The assumptions about fault are supposed to support the idea that some sort of 
evidential norm governs belief.  Our intuitions about lottery propositions are supposed to help us 
see what it takes to satisfy this evidential norm.  We start from the assumption that you should not 
assert or believe lottery propositions.  It is then suggested that the natural explanation for this is 
that you do not have evidence for believing these propositions that would put you in a position to 
know that they are true.  From here, the argument might go in one of two directions.  If someone 
said that it followed from this alone that you ought not believe what you do not know, this would 
repeat the mistakes we have just discussed.  All that follows is that you ought not believe p if you 
are in a position to appreciate that your evidence does not put you in a position to know p.  In 
Gettier cases and in cases where you do not know that p is a lottery proposition, it seems p is not 
known, you do not know that you are not in a position to know p, but it is not obvious that you 
have violated E.  If you think you do violate E in such cases, it seems you will once again be forced 
to accept the JTB analysis of knowledge and an infallibilist account of justification.  If, however, 
someone were argue as follows, these difficulties might be avoided: 
Intuition tells us that evidence is needed for permissible belief.  Intuitions 
about lottery cases tell us that beliefs in lottery propositions are defective 
because there is not adequate evidence for believing them outright.17 The best 
                                                
distinction, see Bach [1985], Engel [1992], Littlejohn [forthcoming a], and Lowy [1978].  
Because the knowledge account tells us that justified beliefs constitute knowledge, if you accept the 
knowledge account, you can say that Gettier cases are possible if you think of such cases as cases 
in which the subject’s belief is unjustified but the subject is justified in believing p.  However, for a 
believer to be justified on Bach’s view, the believer must be epistemically responsible.  According to 
FAULT-3, however, it is impossible for the believer to be justified if the believer does not know 
that what she believes is true.  If you accept FAULT-3, you have to say that it is never possible for 
the believer to be justified if the belief does not constitute knowledge, which means that Gettier 
cases are impossible on this view.             
16  I am only suggesting that one way to take Williamson’s remarks about fault would be to offer 
the sort of argument offered above.  In their defence of the view that you must never reason from 
premises that you do not know to be true, Hawthorne and Stanley [forthcoming] appeal to the 
observation that it is ‘prima facie negligent’ to reason from p when one does not know that p.  The 
qualification ‘prima facie’ makes it difficult to interpret this remark, but I see no obvious connection 
between fault, negligence, and knowledge.  If they are saying that whenever someone does not 
know that p but reasons from the belief that p their ignorance counts towards our saying that they 
are negligent, this seems to call into question the very coherence of the notion of non-culpable 
ignorance.      
17 It is important to stress that the adequacy of evidence is not simply a matter of degree of 
strength.  If one were to say that the reason beliefs in lottery propositions are defective is that the 
 8 
explanation of the observation that you do not satisfy E unless your evidence 
puts you in a position to know that the relevant proposition is true is that K is 
the fundamental norm of belief.18  
This argument rests on a pair of assumptions.  First, the argument assumes that beliefs in lottery 
propositions do not constitute knowledge.  Second, it assumes that you ought not believe lottery 
propositions.  Were we to reject the first assumption, we could not appeal to intuitive verdicts 
about lottery cases to motivate the knowledge account.  If we were to reject the second 
assumption while accepting the first, lottery cases would provide counterexamples to the 
knowledge account.  In response to this argument, I want to say two things.  The knowledge 
account cannot give the best explanation if independent considerations show that K is not a norm 
that governs belief.  The verdicts the knowledge account delivers for covert lottery beliefs and for 
Gettier cases are counterintuitive.  In addition, cases involving covert lottery beliefs suggest that 
while the knowledge account delivers the right verdict about some familiar lottery cases, it gives 
the wrong reason for thinking this is the right verdict.  Intuitions concerning cases of covert lottery 
beliefs suggest that the reason we ought not believe lottery propositions is not that they cannot 
constitute knowledge per se, but that subjects that believe lottery propositions are wrong to do so in 
light of considerations accessible to them (i.e., considerations about the kinds of grounds they have 
for believing lottery propositions).  While such grounds might not put the subject in a position to 
know, the normative significance of this is not what the knowledge account takes it to be. 
                                                
evidence we have for such beliefs is not strong enough, it seems one would be committed to a view 
on which nothing short of certainty warrants outright belief.  Presumably, advocates of the 
knowledge account think that the inadequacy of the evidence available for believing lottery 
propositions is that such evidence is of the wrong kind to warrant outright belief.  What gives us 
warrant to believe mundane propositions (e.g., that I have hands) is that we have more than 
purely statistical grounds for such beliefs or, more carefully, that we do not have to take ourselves 
to have nothing beyond such grounds for such beliefs.  Previously I had said that the evidence we 
have for belief in lottery propositions was ‘insufficient’, and this misleadingly suggested that what 
was needed for the right to believe a proposition is a ground for the belief stronger than that 
available for belief in a lottery proposition.  Finally, it is important to remember, as an 
anonymous referee reminded me, that there are situations in which it seems proper for a subject 
to assert and believe propositions about the outcomes of lotteries (e.g., when the subject has 
insider’s information).  For discussion, see DeRose [1996].      
18 An anonymous referee suggested that this rationale might be useless for Williamson’s purposes.  
I do not disagree.  I think it is worth considering this rationale because of the role it has played in 
recent defences of the knowledge account.  Sutton [2007: 53] maintains that beliefs in lottery 
propositions fail to fulfil E and that this fact can only be explained by appeal to K on the grounds 
that the reason we are disposed to think that such beliefs fail to fulfil E is that they fail to constitute 
knowledge.  I think this locates the explanation in the wrong place since the absence of knowledge 
is not accessible to the subject but the reason for refraining from believing in lottery propositions 
is.  Also, I think we can use a variant of the standard lottery cases to directly challenge the claim 
that K governs belief much in the way that we have used Gettier cases to this effect. 
 9 
 The distinction between covert and overt lottery beliefs is a familiar one, but the 
terminology is not.  Let us say that a covert lottery belief is a belief whose truth or falsity depends 
on the outcome of a lottery when the believer is not in a position to appreciate that this is so.  Let 
us say that an overt lottery belief is a belief in a lottery proposition held by someone who has no 
insider’s information.  If you look at your bank statement and see that you are down to your last 
few dollars, you might reasonably believe that you will not be able to go on safari.  If your mother 
has just purchased you a ticket for a lottery drawing being held later this afternoon without telling 
you, that belief is a covert lottery belief.  Were you to believe that the ticket that your mother 
bought you will lose, that would be an overt lottery belief.  (We are assuming that you know that 
you would be able to afford to go on safari if only you were to win the lottery drawing being held 
this afternoon.)   It seems that overt and covert lottery beliefs will either both constitute knowledge 
or neither will.  If you think that safety is necessary for knowledge, it will be just as easy for a 
covert lottery belief to turn out to be false as an overt one to turn out to be false.  If you think that 
some suitably formulated closure principle holds true, someone will be in a position to know that a 
covert lottery belief is true only if this subject is in a position to know that an overt lottery belief is 
true.  Assuming, as we are, that overt lottery beliefs fail to constitute knowledge, it seems we have 
two reasons for thinking that covert lottery beliefs similarly fail to constitute knowledge.   
If this much is correct, the knowledge account commits us to saying that you should not 
hold or form covert lottery beliefs.19  I think this is bad news for the knowledge account.  First, in 
defences of the knowledge account, the focus has been on the judgments that overt lottery beliefs 
should not be held and cannot constitute knowledge.  No intuitive support has been offered to 
back the claim that neither type of lottery belief ought to be held.  In fact, you might think that 
one of the reasons that the lottery paradox is so interesting is that we are not naturally disposed to 
think of covert lottery beliefs held by others as beliefs they should not continue to hold for reasons 
of which only we are aware (i.e., that unbeknownst to them the truth of their beliefs is contingent 
on the outcome of a lottery).  Second, not only is the knowledge account’s verdict about covert 
lottery cases not intuitive, it seems positively counterintuitive.  To see this, consider a modified 
                                                
19 If this much is not correct, I think this undermines the arguments from lottery propositions to 
the knowledge account.  If someone were to say that overt lottery beliefs constituted knowledge, 
there would be no surprising facts for the knowledge account to explain.  If someone were to say 
that such beliefs did not constitute knowledge but were permissibly held, we would have our 
counterexample to the knowledge account.  If someone were to say that overt lottery beliefs fail to 
constitute knowledge and ought not be held, but held that covert lottery beliefs did constitute 
knowledge, this would bring the knowledge account in line with the intuition that it is not wrong 
to harbour covert lottery beliefs.  However, that would require denying the closure principle and 
that safety is necessary for knowledge.     
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version of one of Hawthorne’s examples.  A friend writes you an email on Monday before a 
lottery is held, but you only read it Tuesday after the results of that lottery are known to you.  It 
contains the following line of reasoning:  
The ticket for tomorrow’s lottery is a loser. 
So if I keep the ticket I will get nothing. 
But if I sell the ticket I will get a penny. 
So, I’d better sell the ticket [2004: 29]. 
You know now that the first premise was not known to be true because of the grounds the subject 
had for that belief and know that the belief turned out to be true.  Retrospectively, it seems you 
would agree with Hawthorne that this reasoning is unacceptable and would likely further agree 
that its unacceptability is due to the speaker’s belief in the argument’s first premise.  Assuming 
that you should not hold beliefs that should not be trusted for the purposes of practical 
deliberation, we would arrive at the view that the speaker should not have held the first belief.  
Even without that assumption, you might agree that the subject should not have held the first 
belief regardless of whether it was fit to figure in practical deliberation.  Now, suppose a different 
friend writes you an email on Monday before a lottery is held, but you only read it Tuesday after 
the results of that lottery are known to you.  You had purchased this friend a ticket for this lottery 
without telling them, but now know that the ticket was a loser.  They had written:   
I want nothing more than to go on safari. 
If I were to go on safari, I would want nothing more than to buy 
a new elephant gun. 
The gun will be useless, however, since I cannot afford to go on 
safari. 
So I guess I will use that money instead to do some repairs 
around the house. 
The subject’s belief in the first premise is known to you to be a covert lottery belief.  The lottery 
was held and the ticket lost.  You know this, so you know that the speaker’s belief in the first 
premise was not known by the speaker to be true and that the speaker was in no position to 
appreciate this fact (i.e., it was an “unknown unknown” in Sutton’s terminology).  I think you 
would not take this reasoning to be unacceptable.20  However, the knowledge account regards 
                                                
20 It is true that if you had responded in time, you might have alerted them to the fact that you 
had purchased them a ticket.  However, in doing so the belief in the first premise would be an 
overt lottery belief rather than a covert lottery belief and it seems far more intuitive to say in that 
altered case that they should have reasoned differently than it does in the case as written that they 
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both instances of reasoning as unacceptable and takes them to be unacceptable for the very same 
reason.  It says neither piece of reasoning is acceptable because both bits of reasoning involve 
crucially beliefs not known to be true.  That the knowledge account delivers the wrong verdict in 
the case of covert lottery beliefs suggests that K does not govern belief.  Additionally, it suggests 
that the knowledge account gives the wrong explanation for the unacceptability of the first bit of 
reasoning.  The knowledge account seeks to explain the unacceptability of this reasoning in terms 
of a fact that is not accessible to the individual engaged in this bit of reasoning (i.e., that one of the 
beliefs involved in the reasoning is not known to be true).  However, if overt and covert lottery 
beliefs have different normative statuses (i.e., one ought never hold overt lottery beliefs but may 
permissibly hold some covert lottery beliefs), it seems that the proper explanation as to why you 
should not reason from overt lottery beliefs should be given in terms of features distinctive of overt 
lottery beliefs (e.g., the kinds of ground available for overt lottery belief) rather than ignorance, per 
se.   
 We have not found a route from the truth norm or the thesis that belief aims at the truth 
to the knowledge norm.  It is not for a lack of trying.  Williamson is right that anyone who thinks 
there is a truth norm should think there is an additional evidential norm governing belief, but we 
know from Gettier that there is more to conforming to the knowledge norm than conforming to 
these two.21   
 
III.  Knowledge and the Aim of Belief  
Rather than try to derive the knowledge account from the truth norm, we might try a different 
approach:  
Belief does not aim at just the truth.  Belief aims at knowledge.  Any belief 
that fails to constitute knowledge is wrongful precisely because there is no 
distinct aim a belief serves that could potentially provide a justification for 
believing without knowing.  
Since the argument assumes nothing about justification and fault, it should not face the problems 
the previous argument did. 
                                                
should have reasoned differently or should not have believed the premises that figured in this 
piece of reasoning.  
21 The considerations offered in support of the knowledge account might not show that you 
should not believe p unless you know p, but they might be taken to show that you should not 
believe p if you are in a position to appreciate that you cannot know p given your epistemic 
position.  We shall later see that we do not need to assume that knowledge is the norm of belief to 
explain why this is an epistemic requirement on permissible belief.  
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 The argument assumes that the aim of belief is knowledge (Bird [2007: 93]; Sutton 
[2007]; Williamson [2000: 48]).  The problem with the argument is simple: knowledge is not the 
aim of belief.  To test proposals about aims, we should consult our intuitions to determine what an 
external observer would say if she knew that another’s belief fails to constitute knowledge.  We 
know that belief aims at the truth, for example, because we know that if someone knows that 
someone else’s belief about p is not true, this outside observer has sufficient warrant for asserting 
that this belief is incorrect or mistaken.  On the hypothesis that belief also aims at knowledge, we 
should expect that those who know we don’t know that p for any reason will be disposed to say we 
have made a mistake, we were wrong to believe what we did, or that we should suspend 
judgment.  This is not what we find.  If this is how we evaluate claims about the epistemic aim 
and the epistemic ought, we not only fail to find support for the knowledge account, we find 
evidence for denying that belief is governed by the knowledge norm.  If beliefs that fail to conform 
to no norms are justified, we find evidence for denying that knowledge of p’s truth is necessary for 
the justification of the belief that p.    
Suppose you think you saw a barn.  You did, but you did not realize that you were in the 
land of fake barns.  Because the hills were filled with convincing fakes, we do not think your belief 
constitutes knowledge.  Knowing this, however, I do not think that your belief failed to fulfil its 
aim.  Knowing that you do not know and why your belief is not knowledge, I would not be 
disposed to tell you are wrong to believe what you do or that you have made a mistake by 
believing that you see a barn.  If a belief such as this does not miss its mark, nothing is left of the 
view that belief aims at knowledge.  The fakes prevent your belief from fulfilling its aim only when 
they fool you into believing a fake barn is genuine.22  Moreover, if we set aside the question about 
aims and focus on the normative question, it seems that if someone said that you should not 
believe it is a barn knowing that your belief fails to constitute knowledge simply because the belief 
is Gettiered, it seems that they have made the mistake, not you.  If that is right, there is nothing 
left of the view that knowledge is what is necessary for permissible belief.     
In saying that it is not epistemically wrong to believe p if that belief has been Gettiered, it 
might seem I am denying something Reynolds [2002: 150] says in his discussion of Gettier cases 
and warranted assertion.  He says the locals who know that you have been driving through fake 
                                                
22 I suppose you could have as an aim knowing whether you saw a barn, but it doesn’t seem you 
must have this as an aim insofar as you’re engaged in the kind of deliberation that results in the 
belief that you saw a barn.  I might also have as an aim believing things that make me popular or 
lead me to have interesting thoughts, but those aims, which I adopt, are not the aims I must have 
insofar as I’m reasoning towards a conclusion that we identify as a belief.   
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barn country would not say that you should believe you saw a barn.23  They know that you were 
reasonable in holding this belief, but they know that given the grounds on which your belief is 
based, you did not have the power to distinguish fake from genuine barns.   
This may be true, but the knowledge account is not necessary for explaining why the 
locals would not (and ought not) say it is permissible for you to believe you saw a barn.  Reynolds 
says the locals do not know whether the particular belief you have formed is true.  They only 
know that your grounds are not effective for determining whether your belief is true.  Because of 
this, it would be wrong for them to assert that you should believe what you do because they do 
not have a true and reasonable belief that your belief satisfies the truth norm.  Once we give the 
locals the additional piece of information that your belief is correct and they know that the sole 
reason you fail to know has to do with factors beyond those that determine whether you are 
justified or you are right, speakers are not disposed to think you should revise your beliefs and 
suspend judgment.  Without this information, however, we cannot use their responses to evaluate 
the respective merits of the knowledge account or the weaker truth account.  
We have covered a considerable amount of ground.  Let’s take stock.  You cannot derive 
the knowledge account from descriptions of the aim of belief.  If we start from only the 
assumption that belief aims at the truth, we get no further than the claim that you ought not 
believe p unless you faithfully and faultlessly represent the world by having that belief.  That is to 
say, you should not believe p unless you satisfy T and E.  Intuitions concerning Gettier cases and 
covert lotteries suggest that belief does not aim at knowledge.  It does not seem that beliefs that 
fail to constitute knowledge for purely Gettierish reasons are incorrect, mistaken, erroneous, or 
fail to fulfil some essential aim.  It also seems it’s not necessarily the case that you ought not hold 
beliefs that fail to constitute knowledge for Gettierish reasons.  The Gettier cases are 
                                                
23  There is a second argument in favour of the knowledge account of assertion worth considering.  
It is not uncommon to say things like ‘If you didn’t know where the restaurant was, you should 
not have said we should have taken that exit’.  Why is it that learning that someone did not know 
p leads us to challenge the propriety of the assertion and belief expressed if knowledge is not the 
norm of assertion and belief?  This is an interesting question.  It is true that in some contexts when 
we learn that someone did not know p we say they had no right to assert p and say in a critical 
tone that they ought not have asserted p.  I do not think, however, that we imply that someone 
lacked the authority simply because they did not know p.  We might say that they should not have 
told us to get off the exit having learned that they were mistaken about the restaurant’s location.  
We might say that they should not have told us to get off the exit having learned that they were 
guessing at the restaurant’s location.  I do not think we would be critical if we learned that someone 
who was correct in their belief that p and reasonable in assuming p but did not know p asserted p.  
It has been observed by Goldman [2002] that in some contexts, we use ‘know’ as something akin 
to firmly held true belief and I think these are contexts in which we use ‘know’ in such a way that 
considerations having to do with accidental connections to the truth are irrelevant.   
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counterexamples to not only the JTB analysis of knowledge, but also the analysis of permissible 
belief as knowledge. 
 
IV.  Moore’s Paradox and the Norm of Belief 
We shall now look at arguments that appeal to observations about Moore’s Paradox in the hopes 
of motivating the knowledge account.  Consider the statement ‘Custer died at Little Big Horn, but 
I believe he did not’.  It seems contradictory to assert this statement, but it easily could have been 
true.  (I know next to nothing about the history of the United States.)  What accounts for the 
appearance of contradiction in the absence of contradiction?  One suggestion is that anyone who 
holds the beliefs associated with Moorean absurd statements holds beliefs that conflict with the 
rational commitments that come with those very beliefs (Adler [2002]; de Almeida [2001]; 
Huemer [2007]).24  For example, it is thought that belief has as its aim the truth, and someone 
who holds the beliefs associated with ‘Custer died at Little Big Horn, but I believe he did not’ 
would be committed to denying the accuracy of the belief expressed by the first conjunct.  That is 
akin to a contradiction.  The appearance of contradiction is explained in terms of the conscious 
conflict between the beliefs of which the subject is aware and the rational commitments that come 
with the beliefs associated with the Moorean absurd statements (e.g., such as the fact that, by her 
lights, she has misrepresented how things stand by believing Custer died at Little Big Horn).   
 The arguments we are about to consider rest on a methodological assumption that I shall 
accept for the purposes of this discussion:  
                                                
24 What is a ‘rational commitment’?  In speaking of rational commitments, someone might have 
one of two notions in mind.  On one reading, to say that by Φ-ing S has violated some rational 
commitment is to say that given further attitudes of S’s, S violates what Broome [1999] refers to 
as a ‘normative requirement’, a requirement that can be stated by a statement where the ‘ought’ 
takes wide-scope and enjoins or forbids S to form or from holding certain attitudes in 
combination.  For example, it seems irrational to believe that the world was created in under 
seven days while believing it must have taken at least eight.  Anyone who holds such beliefs will 
violate the normative requirement that states, in effect, you must not: believe the world was 
created in under seven days and at least eight days.  On another, to say that by Φ-ing S has 
violated some rational commitment is to say that S’s Φ-ing violates some norm which can be 
expressed by a statement where the ‘ought’ takes narrow scope and enjoins or forbids S to form or 
refrain from forming attitudes under certain conditions.  Think about the knowledge norm.  It 
enjoins S to refrain from believing p if S does not know p.  While it seems plausible to think that 
minimally rational agents can be charged with irrationality for violating normative requirements, 
it seems far less plausible to think that every failure to conform to a norm is less than fully rational.  
It seems more charitable to think of talk of rational requirements that come with belief in terms of 
normative requirements.  The arguments for the knowledge norm, then, will be attempts to derive 
norms from normative requirements.  In effect, we will be looking at attempts to show that if, say, 
there is a normative requirement that states ‘You ought not both believe p and believe you do not 
know p’ there is a norm according to which ‘If you do not know that p, you should not believe p’.   
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MA: Anyone who holds the beliefs associated with a Moorean 
absurd statement holds beliefs that conflict with the rational 
commitments that come with those very beliefs.25 
The first argument tries to establish that knowledge is the norm of belief on the basis of two 
assumptions, one of which is undeniable and one of which is thought to follow from MA.  
According to the second, our intuitions will lead us to classify types of statements as Moorean 
absurdities that could only have that status if knowledge is in fact the norm of belief.  According to 
the third, alternatives to the knowledge account are too weak to explain why certain kinds of 
Moorean absurdities have that status. 
Huemer [2007] defends the thesis that knowledge is the norm of belief as follows:  
Consciously believing p rationally commits you, upon reflection, to 
comprehensively, epistemically endorsing your belief that p (MCP).  
Knowledge attribution is the most comprehensive epistemic endorsement 
(ETK).  If you believed p it would be wrong to have that belief without 
endorsing it as knowledge.  But, you should not endorse that belief as 
knowledge unless it is knowledge.  Therefore, you ought not believe p unless 
you know p.26    
In defence of MCP, remember that MA tells us that whenever someone utters a Moorean 
absurdity, they have uttered something absurd because the beliefs associated with that statement 
conflict with the rational commitments that come with those beliefs and so those beliefs cannot be 
comprehensively endorsed.27  As for ETK, there seems to be no more comprehensive epistemic 
endorsement of a belief than one that says the belief constitutes knowledge.28 
                                                
25 Those who think that Moorean absurdity has everything to do with speech and nothing to do 
with thought will reject the argument for the knowledge account at a stage earlier than I will by 
rejecting the methodological assumption central to this line of argument.  For arguments that the 
paradox is not about speech alone, see Shoemaker [1996].  
26 Huemer [2007] defends both the view that you should not believe what you take yourself not to 
know (i.e., that there is a normative requirement to the effect that you should not believe both 
that p is true and that p is not known to you) and that there is a sense in which a belief that fails to 
constitute knowledge for any reason is epistemically not as it ought to be (i.e., that there is a norm 
to the effect that you should not believe p unless you know p to be true). 
27 An anonymous referee suggested that Huemer’s [2007] MCP is not sufficiently different from 
Foley’s [1993] account of egocentric epistemic rationality to avoid the difficulties that Foley’s view 
faces.  This might be right, but even if there is nothing wrong with this approach to epistemic 
rationality it lends no support to the knowledge account.  So, I hope to bracket more general 
concerns about either of these authors’ approaches to epistemic rationality. 
28 An anonymous referee suggested that it was unclear how Huemer’s [2007] account could 
explain the absurdity of assertions such as, “You know that it is raining but I do not agree with 
you”.  I think he could do so as follows.  The speaker knows that by asserting that another knows 
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Suppose we were to grant ETK.  Here is an initial worry about Huemer’s strategy.  His 
argument implicitly assumes that each of the conditions that figure in a comprehensive epistemic 
evaluation pertains to the permissibility of belief.29  This does not seem right.  Consider moral 
evaluation.  A moral evaluation that focused on just the permissibility of some action would not be 
a comprehensive evaluation.  A comprehensive evaluation of an action should not only tell us 
whether the act was permissible, but also whether the act had moral worth.  That my act lacks 
moral worth does not show that I have acted impermissibly and so does not show that my act 
lacked justification.  Similarly, that my action was not supererogatory similarly does not show that 
my action calls for a justification.  Huemer offers no reason to think that a comprehensive 
evaluation of belief would concern only a belief’s deontic status.  Thus, even if we assume ETK, it 
would not be surprising if some of the conditions necessary for knowledge were not necessary for 
permissible belief.  We need some reason for thinking that a comprehensive epistemic 
endorsement is only concerned with properties that are of deontic significance, and he gives us no 
such reason.  We have already seen some reason to think that the permissibility of believing p does 
not turn on that belief’s being properly endorsed along all lines of epistemic evaluation.  Suppose 
you thought that if a belief constitutes knowledge, that belief is more valuable from the epistemic 
point of view than a belief that fails to so constitute knowledge.  Along one line of evaluation, a 
true belief someone is justified in holding might be less valuable than an item of knowledge.  
(Think of Gettier cases and covert lottery beliefs.)  The additional value that attaches to beliefs 
that constitute knowledge would only be necessary for permissible belief if we were to say that you 
should never harbour covert lottery beliefs or hold beliefs in Gettier cases.  So, we either have to 
say that a comprehensive epistemic endorsement concerns more than just that which bears on the 
permissibility of belief or deny the evaluative claim that items of knowledge are epistemically 
more valuable than beliefs that fail to do so.30  If a comprehensive epistemic endorsement 
                                                
p, the speaker is committed to, inter alia, the truth of p.  By asserting that the speaker does not 
agree with what the other subject believes, the speaker is asserting that the speaker does not 
believe p.  Thus, this case reduces to the omissive version of Moore’s Paradox, “It is raining out 
but I do not believe it”.  I do not see why Huemer cannot offer the same treatment of the omissive 
version of Moore’s Paradox that I do below.    
29 Huemer [2007: 149] says that a comprehensive epistemic endorsement is one that endorses a 
belief along all dimensions of epistemic evaluation and adds that any belief that cannot be so 
endorsed is such that there is no reason that the subject should not hold the belief. 
30 Many assume that knowledge is epistemically more valuable than mere true belief.  For 
discussion, see Kvanvig [2003].  The assumption here is slightly different.  I am assuming that a 
subject’s having knowledge that something is true is more valuable than a proper subset of the 
‘parts’ of this subject’s knowledge.  For a helpful discussion of strategies designed to explain why 
this is so, see Pritchard [2007].   
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concerns more than just those properties of a belief that are of deontic relevance, a belief might 
not be one we can endorse and not amount to knowledge even if it is permissibly held. 
Maybe this worry is relatively minor.  This next worry is much more serious.  While the 
knowledge account does seem to follow from MCP and ETK, you also get the result that you 
should not believe p unless you know that you know that you know (etc…) that p.  Clearly, the 
argument needs revision.  It is not hard to find the needed fix.  We simply have to rewrite MCP 
and say that consciously believing p requires that you should not believe yourself to fail to satisfy 
the standards of a comprehensive epistemic endorsement while also consciously believing p.  This 
revision is independently motivated.  It is simply not true that if you permissibly believe p, you 
ought to believe that your belief satisfies a comprehensive epistemic endorsement.  Failing to have 
any belief about whether you know p when you happen to believe p (and happen not to be wrong 
to do so) is no sin at all.  What rationality requires is that you revise your beliefs if you believe that 
you cannot comprehensively endorse them (i.e., by judging that they are false, that they don’t 
amount to knowledge, etc…).   
We should replace MCP with:  
MCP-:  Consciously believing p rationally commits you, upon 
reflection, to refrain from believing both p and that p 
cannot satisfy the standards of a comprehensive 
epistemic endorsement.31 
Once we replace MCP with this, we have undermined the argument for the knowledge account.  
According to ETK and MCP-, all that permissibly believing p requires is that you do not both 
believe that you do not know that p while holding the belief that p, and that is a requirement you 
could easily satisfy even if you did not know that p.  All it takes to satisfy this requirement is not 
conceding that you do not know p. 
Adler [2002] offers a similar argument for the knowledge account, but it seems not to 
suffer from the same difficulties.  He thinks we can use our intuitive sense of which combinations 
of attitudes would constitute Moorean absurd combinations to tell us something about the norms 
governing those attitudes and is as follows:  
                                                
31 MCP- should do for the purposes of a normative solution to Moore’s Paradox.  Remember that 
the justification for MCP was the thought that someone who would believe the beliefs associated 
with a Moorean absurd statement would be conscious of violating some fundamental norm of 
belief, not that they hadn’t bothered to affirm that every proposition they believed was in fact as it 
should be.  Violations of MCP- are sins of commission, whereas violations of MCP, such as they 
are, can be sins of omission.  As noted above, if you simply fail to believe you know p and believe 
p, there is nothing irrational, odd, contradictory, or untoward about that.     
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According to MA, if any judgment that expresses the belief that p is coupled 
with the acknowledgement that some condition C does not obtain, you are 
cognizant that, by holding these beliefs, you violate rational requirements on 
holding those beliefs.  The judgment expressed by ‘p but I do not know it’ is 
incoherent in the way Moorean absurdities are.  Therefore, in judging that 
you do not know p, you know there is something wrongful in believing p—
namely, that you do not know p. 
This is an advance because the argument does not assume the Metacoherence Principle.  Instead, 
it relies on the incoherence test:  
IT: If it is incoherent in the way Moorean absurd statements 
are to Φ while acknowledging that C does not obtain, in 
acknowledging that C does not obtain, you are cognizant 
of something that makes it wrong to Φ—namely, that C 
does not obtain. 
Given our methodological assumption concerning the proper resolution of Moore’s Paradox (i.e., 
that Moorean absurdity is due to the way in which a subject would consciously violate the rational 
requirements by consciously affirming the attitudes that constitute the absurd thought), it seems 
we can test proposals concerning the norms of belief as follows.  If it is incoherent to 
simultaneously believe p while believing C does not obtain in the way a Moorean absurd thought 
is (i.e., apparently contradictory without being a belief in a contradiction), there is a norm that 
enjoins us to refrain from believing p when C does not obtain.  For example, it seems incoherent 
to believe the following:  
(1)  I believe Custer died at Little Big Horn, but he did not. 
In representing the belief about Custer as being false, it seems we have an incoherent 
combination of attitudes without a contradiction.  Perhaps this is due to the fact that belief is 
governed by the truth norm.  It seems similarly incoherent to believe:  
(2)  I believe Custer died at Little Big Horn, but there is no 
reason for me to think that. 
On the assumption that the only thing that could be a reason for me to believe is a piece of 
evidence, it seems we can infer from the fact that (2) is a Moorean absurd thought that the belief 
about Custer is governed by an evidential norm.  It has been observed that it is incoherent to 
believe both that p is true and that this belief fails to satisfy one of the conditions necessary for 
knowledge.  It is also incoherent to believe that p but that p is not known to be true.  So, by similar 
reasoning, it seems that we ought to accept that knowledge is the norm of belief.   
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 Unfortunately, this test is insufficiently discriminating and might be useful only for 
uncovering normative requirements governing combinations of belief rather than useful for 
uncovering the norms that govern those beliefs individually.  To appreciate the first problem, 
consider an example:  
  (3)  God hates my atheism and it is raining outside.32 
This is a Moorean absurd thought.  However, there is no norm that enjoins us to refrain from 
believing that it is raining outside unless God forgives the non-believer.  It is no mystery as to why 
(3) is incoherent.  It is incoherent because the belief that God hates my atheism is a Moorean 
absurdity in its own right.  At the very least, IT needs to be reformulated to avoid these sorts of 
example.  Even if we grant that for every incoherent pair of attitudes there is something you are 
cognizant of that makes one of the attitudes you are conscious of wrongful, we could say what 
makes it wrongful is precisely that it is held in combination with the belief that C does not obtain.  
It might be that this belief alone is absurd, irrational, or contravenes an epistemic norm.  We 
might say, as it were, that whenever believing p while believing C does not obtain constitutes a 
Moorean absurdity, all that follows is that:  
  (4)  You should not believe: p and that C does not obtain. 
That is different from:  
  (5)  If C does not obtain you should not believe p. 
The former is a normative requirement and the ‘ought’ takes wide scope.  The latter is a norm in 
which the ‘ought’ takes narrow scope.  The former tells us what combinations of attitudes we 
ought to avoid.  The latter tells us what sorts of conditions bear on whether to hold the belief in 
question.  As we are trying to derive norms such as the knowledge norm (i.e., if you do not know p 
you must not believe p) from judgments about rational combinations of attitudes (i.e., it is 
irrational to believe both that p is true and not known to be true), we need some reason to think 
that we can proceed from intuitive judgments about irrational combinations of attitude to 
judgments about attitudes we have reason to refrain from holding when certain non-mental 
conditions obtain (i.e., that we have reason to refrain from believing falsehoods or those beliefs 
not known to be true even when we have no clue that our beliefs are false or fail to constitute 
knowledge). 
 Maybe these problems are not insuperable.  To deal with the first, we can revise IT as 
follows:  
IT2: If it is incoherent in the way Moorean absurd statements 
are to Φ while acknowledging that C does not obtain and the 
                                                
32 The example is inspired by one of Sorensen’s [1988]. 
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belief that C does not obtain is not itself incoherent, in 
acknowledging that C does not obtain, you are cognizant of 
something that makes it wrong to Φ—namely, that C does not 
obtain. 
To deal with the second and more fundamental problem, we might say this.  The reason that it is 
irrational to believe both that p is true and that C does not obtain is that in representing your 
present situation as one in which C does not obtain you thereby appreciate that if that belief is 
correct, you should expect there to be reason not to believe p.  Moreover, if that belief is incorrect 
it is still by your lights a situation where there is reason not to believe p.  To believe against what 
you take to be good reasons is itself a kind of epistemic wrong.33   
 Perhaps this suffices to address the difficulties that arose for IT, but while we might have 
saved the test we have revised the test in such a way that it no longer lends support to the 
knowledge account.  To appreciate this, note the following.  The test only applies when the belief 
that C does not obtain is a belief that is not incoherent taken on its own.  While we might grant 
that if C is a condition necessary for knowledge it is incoherent to believe both that p is true and 
that C does not obtain, we only find confirmation of the knowledge account if we assume also that 
for any condition C such that C is a condition necessary for knowledge it is coherent to believe on 
its own that C does not obtain.  This is not what we find.   
Let me explain.  It is not incoherent to believe that you do not know p because p is false.  
So, according to IT2 there is a norm that enjoins us to refrain from believing the false.  It is not 
incoherent to believe that you do not know p because your evidence does not put you in a position 
to know whether p.  So, according to IT2, there is a norm that enjoins us to refrain from believing 
without evidence.34  What of the conditions beyond this necessary for knowledge?  So far, we have 
only confirmed that you should not believe the false and not believe without evidence. The belief 
that my belief about p is Gettiered, like the belief that God will not forgive my atheism, is 
incoherent taken on its own.  There are many ways to Gettier a belief, but I shall focus on two.  In 
the first sort of case, your evidence for believing p is undermined thanks to true propositions of 
which you are unaware.  In the second sort of case, your evidence for believing p only accidentally 
leads you to the correct judgment concerning p. 
                                                
33 The principle that you have some reason to refrain from believing what you not unreasonably 
take yourself to have reason to refrain from believing seems intuitively more plausible than the 
principle that allows for bootstrapping and posits a reason to believe associated with any not 
unreasonable judgment that you have reason to believe.  
34 Adler [2002], de Almeida [2001], and Williams [1994] offer explanations along these lines and 
do not rely on the knowledge norm to explain the absurdity of the judgments associated with ‘p 
but I do not believe p’, ‘I believe p, but ~p’, and ‘p but there is no reason to believe p’.   
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 It is reasonably clear why you cannot coherently and correctly believe yourself to be in 
the first sort of case.  To believe yourself to be in such a case, you have to believe of some piece of 
evidence (i) that you are unaware of it and (ii) that it would, if combined with your present 
evidence, undermine the justification you have for believing p.  However, you would have this 
evidence in mind if you were to believe this.  The case is not possible.35  If you were aware of the 
evidence you would no longer be justified in believing what you did.  This means this would not 
be a Gettier case. 
What about the second sort of Gettier case in which your failure to know that p is due to 
the accidental connection between your grounds and the truth?  You cannot coherently believe 
that you fail to know that p simply because you are only accidentally related to the truth about p.  
To believe that your connection to the truth is accidental is (roughly) to believe that if p turns out 
to be true, this is not to be expected.  The judgment that you are in this sort of Gettier case 
amounts to the complex judgment that p is true but that you are not in an epistemic position to 
expect that it is true.  This is a Moorean absurdity in its own right.  We can account for its 
absurdity by noting that someone with such attitudes would take their belief that p is true to fail to 
fulfil the evidential norm since what is to be expected is a function of the evidence available.  The 
subject’s taking it to be the case that the truth of the relevant belief is not to be expected is 
acknowledging that by her lights she cannot expect to be right given her evidence.  IT2 fails to 
confirm that this condition is necessary for permissible belief.  
The challenging case for those who do not think knowledge is the norm of belief is this 
one:  
(6)  p but I do not know p.36 
                                                
35 Michael Huemer suggested that I might be stacking the deck in describing the case as one in 
which you are both aware and unaware of a piece of evidence.  Perhaps we should ask whether 
you might coherently believe that, say, you see a barn but there is evidence of which you’re 
unaware which would undermine the evidence you now have for that belief.  Note that if you had 
a belief about your evidence to this effect, your evidence would be undermined.  This would not 
be a Gettier case because you would not be justified in believing that you saw a barn.  It is 
impossible to coherently and correctly believe that you fail to know because you are in the first 
sort of Gettier case, in which case the incoherence test fails to confirm that not being in such a 
case is necessary for permissibly believing p. 
36 DeRose [2002] for example seems to think that assertions of the form of (6) are just the sort of 
case we need the knowledge norm of assertion to address.  His solution is that the assertion of ‘p’ 
represents the speaker as knowing p although what the assertion expresses is correct iff p.  While it 
seems this account might have the resources for explaining why asserting (6) is improper, it does 
not seem to give us any explanation as to why the judgment that (6) is true is also incoherent or 
absurd.     
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If you take yourself not to know that p because you take yourself not to believe p, say, then we 
have a situation where your second-order belief is transparently falsified by a fact about your own 
mind.  If you take yourself not to know that p because you take it to be that p is false, we can 
explain the incoherence by appeal to the truth norm.  If you take yourself not to know that p 
because you have insufficient evidence by your own lights, we can explain this in terms of the 
evidential norm.  That norm in turn can be derived from the truth norm in just the way 
Williamson suggested earlier.  And, if you take yourself not to know because you take yourself to 
be in a Gettier case, we have already seen how the evidential norm can explain the incoherence of 
that attitude.  It seems that we have our bases covered.   
 If we were to assume that the solution of Moore’s Paradox should be given in normative 
terms and assume that MA is true, while the knowledge account might have the resources to 
explain the absurdity of the thoughts we have thus considered it seems the knowledge account is 
unnecessary for explaining why Moorean absurd thoughts strike us as contradictory.  It seems we 
can explain the same data using either the truth norm combined with the evidential norm or the 
evidential norm taken on its own.  So, while some might think that MA is a dubious assumption 
and dispense with the very idea of using Moore’s Paradox as a way of uncovering the norms of 
belief, MA properly understood does not lead us to endorse the idea that the reason that the 
concept of knowledge is significant is that it plays an essential role in the formulation of the norms 
of belief.   
 
V.  Conclusion 
Because people want to draw parallels between assertion and belief and because the knowledge 
account of assertion is so popular, it is not surprising that people are taking seriously the 
suggestion that knowledge is the norm of belief.  Those who are willing to seriously entertain the 
suggestion that knowledge is necessary for permissible belief should be willing to seriously 
entertain the suggestion that permissible belief is a matter of faultlessly and faithfully representing 
the world.   This view, which takes the truth norm to be the fundamental norm of belief, has no 
less intuitive support than the knowledge account.  It does no worse than the knowledge account 
does in addressing Moore’s Paradox.  As an added bonus, it is motivated by reasonably 
uncontroversial claims about the aim of belief and does not deliver the wrong verdicts concerning 
cases of covert lottery beliefs and Gettier cases. 
 There is something puzzling about the knowledge account.  It is not hard to understand 
why the internal conditions necessary for knowledge could be taken to have normative 
significance.  Someone who believes p without satisfying the internal conditions necessary for 
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knowledge has failed to exercise proper responsibility over her beliefs.  It is not difficult to 
understand why the truth of a belief could be taken to have normative significance.  What a belief 
is supposed to do is offer an accurate picture of the world, so any inaccurate beliefs is thereby 
defective.  It seems that in offering a justification for belief what the justification is supposed to do 
is address charges that the belief is wrongful, which is a matter of showing that the belief is not 
defective and showing that you have not failed to exercise proper authority in coming to hold it.37  
The further conditions that distinguish a belief that faithfully and faultlessly represents the world 
from a belief that constitutes knowledge does not intuitively have much by way of normative 
significance.  That you have faultlessly but accidentally managed to get what you want suggests 
that you have fulfilled your goals and done so in a way that does not speak badly of you.  How 
could that not be enough for permissible belief?   
If we look at some of the traditional moral doctrines, such as those associated with the 
doctrine of double effect, there is this thought that there is always two ways to do the wrong thing, 
either by bringing about that which ought to be avoided or by carrying on in a way that shows a 
lack of proper respect for the good.38  The truth account captures this idea.  We take as our 
foundational premise the suggestion that the norm of belief is truth.  Because of this, you ought 
not believe without adequate evidence for believing without such evidence shows a lack of proper 
respect for the good.  Because of this, you ought not believe what is false because such beliefs fail 
to promote what matters fundamentally.  It is hard to grasp the suggestion that there is always 
some third way of going wrong.  Perhaps you will agree that there is something to be said for the 
hypothesis that justified belief just is a belief that faithfully, faultlessly represents the world.  It 
might not be much, but it might be more than there is to be said for the idea that only knowledge 
can earn you the right to believe.39   
                                                
37 This is not the time to address those with ‘responsibilist’ sympathies who think that the 
justification of a belief cannot be threatened by conditions the subject cannot be held responsible 
for failing to take account of.  Someone could say that while belief is governed by the truth norm, 
the mere failure to conform to that norm does not show that a belief is unjustified.  Following Bird 
[2007], someone might say that a belief fails to be justified only if a subject’s failure to conform to 
the norms governing belief is something for which the subject can properly be held accountable.  
This might enable them to say that belief is governed by the truth norm while maintaining that 
the notion of justified belief is an internalist notion. 
38 Mark van Roojen thinks Philippa Foot might have said something to this effect.  If she did not, 
someone should.   
39 I would like to thank Matt Burstein, John Gibbons, Sandy Goldberg, Mark van Roojen, 
Jonathan Sutton, as well as members of the SMU philosophy department works in progress group 
and the audience members at the CSPA for discussing the issues addressed in this paper.  I also 
would like to thank Robert Howell, Mike Huemer, Todd Stuart, and two anonymous referees for 
this journal for incredibly useful written comments.  Robert Howell and an anonymous referee for 
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